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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
H. ALF~I<~N BAKER, 
Petitioner, 
--\'S.-
INDl:WL1RIAL COl\11\fISSION OF 
UTAH, \V. L. YOUNG BROKER-
AGJ1~ COl\1 P ANY and the STATE 
INSUR.A NCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
Case 
No.10288 
PETITIO·NER'S BRIEF 
STArrEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner claims workmen's compensation benefits 
tlirough the State Insurance Fund as a result of an injury 
received in the course of employment at W. L. Young 
Brokerage Company on May 8, 1964. Liability was de-
nir•d, and on July 30, 1964, petitioner made application 
for hearjng to settle her claim. The claim was denied, 
pdition for rehearing was denied and this review was 
t;1 ken. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Petitioner seeks a decision reversing the order of 
the Industrial Commission and directing that petitioner's 
claim for compensation be allowed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 8, 1964, petitioner was employed by W. L. 
Young Brokerage Company as a clerk-typist, earning 
$265.00 per month for an eight-hour day, five-day week. 
About 4 p.m. on that day petitioner testified that 
she was filing papers in a filing cabinet and as she stooped 
over or raised up she felt a sudden sharp pain in her left 
hip and leg (R-10, lines 17-21). May 8, 1964, was a Fri-
day. Petitioner reported back for work Monday morning 
and worked all week, though there was continuous pain 
(R-11, lines 19-25). 
Peetitioner reported her injury to a Mr. Douglas 
Smith on May 12, 1964. He was a sales supervisor for 
the W. L. Young Brokerage Company and petitioner 
was subject to his control and supervision (R-12, lines 
1-18). 
On May 16, 1964, petitioner consulted N. R. Beck, 
M.D., and informed him that she felt a sharp pain in her 
back when she pulled out a filing drawer at work (R-2, 
item 1). Dr. Beck diagnosed petitioner's injury as a 
lumbar disc syndrome (R-2, item 2). Dr. Chester B. 
Powell examined petitioner on May 22, 1964, and he re-
lates that his findings were consistent with disc hernia-
tion (R-4, Para. 2). 
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l'Ptitioncr remained unable to ambulate without se-
,-crc paiu aml as a result, myelography was performed on 
;\Liy 27, 19G4, which confirmed a large defect at T 11-12 
and a small defect at L 5 S 1, with a chopping off of the 
s 1 11cne route. Petitioner underwent surgery on May 
2~ and both levels were explored through separate incis-
ions, disclosing a disc extrusion at the lumbosacral level 
with a rather large anomalous vein in the lower thoracic 
region. ( R-4, Par. 3 and 4) 
The only scintilla of evidence, if evidence it be, that 
petitioner was not injured at work is contained in the 
employer's first report of injury, where it is stated: "We 
are not positive that the injury occurred at work." (R-1, 
Para. 20) At R-1, paragraph 22, the employer states that 
the employee recently moved, and reported discomfort 
clue to moving furniture. That is an unsworn statement, 
and petitioner could not cross-examine to test authen-
tirity. Under oath, petitioner stated she moved about 
a month ririor to May 8, 1964, and that all of her furni-
ture was moved by a mover, and that she merely packed 
the dishes and knick-knacks, and that she did not injure 
herself in any way or do any heavy lifting. (R-18, lines 
1-10) It should also be pointed out that the employer's 
fin.<t report of injury R-1, paragraph 17, states that date 
of injury was May 13, 1964, which is completely contrary 
to all the testimony and other exhibits contained in the 
rel'orrl. Doctors Beck and Powell in their reports, R-2, 
paragraph :J, indicate that petitioner's back injury was 
not <lue to any pre-existing condition. Doctors Beck and 
Powell reported they were told by petitioner that she re-
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ceived injury on May 8, 1964, while doing filing worl: 
Petitioner also testified that way as did five other wit 
nesses produced by petitioner at the hearing held on o(' 
tober 19, 1964. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDING OF THE COMMISSION THAT 
THE BACK AILMENT OF PETITIONER WA~ 
NOT CAUSED BY ACCIDENT ARISING om 
OF OR IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYME?\T 
IS CAPRICIOUS, ARBITRARY AND NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The sole finding in the order denying compensatio1, 
to petitioner is the statement of petitioner taken out ot 
context where she testified: "And I hadn't done any 
thing out of the ordinary either at home or at work, 01 
after work, to have caused it. Very definitely." That l' 
the finding in the order denying liability, 3rd paragrapl1. 
R-35. 
That language taken from testimony of petitioner 
was a partial answer, and is found at R-18, lines 21-2.1, 
which was upon cross-examination of petitioner by ~Ir 
Charles Welch. The full context of that particular ques 
tion and answer at R-18, commencing line 18, is: 
"Q: Now I take it that you do not know exactl1 
what caused this problem with your back~ 
''A: No, I don't. Except that it occurred while I 
was filing in the office. And I hadn't done an) 
thing out of the ordinary either, at home or\ 
work, or after work, to have caused it. Very dct 
nitely." 
4 
l'r•titio111•r :·rnhmits that it is supercilious to take one 
1.,ill' pl1r;1;-,t· a11<1 deny liability. It is obvious that she 
tr·~titicil ill the same answer that the back rnJury oc-
enncd \Yhile sh<• was filing in the office. 
,\t the l1earing petitioner testified on direct exami-
iuttion n s to 1 he even ts of l\Iay 8, 1964, as follows : 
"<J. Calling your attention to the 8th day of l\Iay, 
1 %-t - tl1e calern1ar will reflect that was a Friday 
-- would you relate to these gentlemen what you 
did 011 that day'? 
'' ;\ : Yes. I did my usual work, and then I 
1 Ji ought that I had better get the filing done. Be-
cause ~Ir. J e11sen, my boss, works on Saturday, 
and I like to have the papers in the drawers so 
that he could find them. First I filed in a little file 
that we have that is on wheels, has two drawers, 
and then I got into the bank file and was filing 
there, and as I stooped over, or raised - I can't 
remember exactly how it happened - I suddenly 
had a pain in my left hip and down my leg. And I 
rubbe<1 it, arn1 realized that our principal - who 
\\L1i::l i 11 tlwre, in Gordon's office - could see me, so 
l stopped rubbing, and waited and finished up my 
work, and went home at 5 :00 o'clock. This hap-
Jll'llCd around 4 :00." (R-10, lines 11-25) 
"\ t H-12, lines 16-18 she testified that she had been 
tilin~· and gotten the pain, that she noticed the principal 
r·ould see her rubbing it and she quit and that the pain 
\\as qnitt~ seven~. 
~\t H-1\ lirn·s 13-17, again on cross-examination by 
\Ir. \Vc•l<·li, pditione1· testified: 
'· (J: l heard you say that yon received this pain 
<ls .nm stooped over, or raised up. 
"A: Yrs. 
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'' Q: Is that what happened? 
''A: That's what happened.'' 
In fairness to petitioner and in the spirit of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act that language should hare 
been adopted as the finding by the Commission rather 
than the capricious, out-of-context language petitioner 
complains of. The objective of the act is to alleviate 
hardship on workers, Spencer v. Inditstrial Commission 
' 
4 Utah 2nd 185, 290 Pac. 2nd 692, not to permit the Com-
mission to toy with semantics and sentence structure of 
testimony that is very clear in context. 
On cross-examination, petitioner testified at R-18, 
lines 11-17 that she had not had any previous pain or 
troubles with her back except that she fell downstairs 
approximately 19 years ago, and that Dr. Beck informed 
her that that couldn't be a causative factor. 
On re-direct examination petitioner testified: 
'' Q : You didn't notice any pain on Friday, Ma: 
8th, until you were bending down, or getting up 
from a stooped position? 
"A: It was while I was at the file, doing my work. 
I hadn't placed the papers in alphabetical posi-
tion at that time. I was just filing them as they 
came up, so I was up and down. 
"Q: Up and down? 
"A: Yes. 
"Q: And it happened during that time? 
"A: Yes, that's right." (R-22, lines 9-18) 
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·f !ic entire testimony of petitioner stands for the 
prnpositiou tliat she received the injury while raising up 
and <10\\'11 <loi11g filing. 
To furtl1er substantiate the fact of injury on May 8, 
1%4, while filing, petitioner produced at the hearing 
JJ cleu Morris, who is a waitress in a cafe across the street 
from Young Brokerage Company (R-23, lines 5-15). She 
stntcd tlial on J\fay 11, 1964, which was the Monday fol-
lowing the Friday injury, that she saw petitioner and 
noticed she was in pain. She asked her what was the 
matter arnl pditioner told her that she hurt her back on 
!i'J"iclay while filing. (R-24, line 2-14) 
Mrs. Phyllis TV right testified that she talked with pe-
titioilt'r on Saturday, May 9, and that petitioner told her 
sbe eouldn 't go out because of a severe pain in her back, 
and that she hurt her back at work. (R-25, 26) 
Mrs. Phyllis Larsen testified that on Friday, May 
16, 1964, she talked with petitioner and petitioner told 
her she was going to the hospital for a back operation 
nncl that she must have hurt her back when she was bend-
ing over filing at work. (R-27, 28) 
Beverly Cudney testified that she had a date to go 
ont with petitioner on May 12, 1964, which was Tuesday. 
Petitioner met Mrs. Cudney at 5 :30 p.m. and petitioner 
appeared to be in pain. When she asked petitioner what 
·\\'as the matter, it ·was related to her that she hurt her 
hack last Friday when she was filing. (R-29, 30) 
illrs. Oladys Timothy, plaintiff's sister, talked with 
1w1 itio111-'r 011 Friday, May 8, 1964, after work. Mrs. 
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rrimothy testified that petitioner told her she had he('!J 
filing and was stooping over aml got a pain or kink iii 
her back, and that in her entire life, she lwtl never heard 
of any back complaints coming from petitioner heforr" 
(R-30-32) 
The Commission, m its order denying recoven 
doesn't state that these five witnesses made statement.' 
that were <lsbelieved, but rather they should have bee 11 
accepted as tending to prove date of injury and injun 
in the course of employment. Supra, Allen v. Industrial 
Commission (Utah) 172, Pac. 2nd 669. 
All of that is competent evidence. It is not rebutte<l. 
The language relied on by the Commission, by itself, j, 
not at all what was testified to and it is so contrary a]l(l 
far afield, that minds of reasonable men would not diffor 
as to the unfair conclusion and meaning placed thereon 
by the Commission. 
In order to reverse the Commission, petitioner i' 
aware that "the record must disclose that there is 111afr 
rial, substantial, competent, uncontradictcd cvirleucc f,, 
make a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a maff,•1 
of law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily a11 11 
capriciously disregarded t71e evidence or 11nreaso11a/Jlf1 
refused to believe such evidence." K cnt v. Ind11st1iu: 
Conimission, 57 Pac. 2nd 7 44, citing Kavalinakis v. I11d11' 
trial Comniis;.;ion, 67 Utah 174, 246 Pac. 698; Gagos '· 
Industrial Commission (Utah) 48 Pac. 2nd 449, 450. 
This is such a case, but with one added facet of ea· 
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\\hen the language the Commission relied upon 
tn de11» rl'lief is placed back in context, it doesn't even 
:.,1)- 1., ha i tlwy would lead us to believe it says. 
The <lecision in Holland v. Inditstrial Commission, 5 
f'illh 2nd 103, 297 Pac. 2nd 230, sustaining an order deny-
ing rclirf for a ruptured disc revealed that after falling, 
Hollum! merely stated that he was shaken up, and none of 
t!Jr rnedirnl rerords or any other evidence revealed he 
claimC'd injury as a result of industrial accident. The 
record in the case at bar is entirely contrary to that 
record. 
Tlw case of llunter v. Industrial Commission, 73 
Jri1:. 84-, 2:~7 Pac. 2nd 813, on the other hand, is squarely 
i11 point J1ere. Panline Hunter testified that she felt a 
slrnrp pain in her back -vvhile putting toys on a low shelf. 
Sl1c told others of her pain. The Commission denied 
l'\'lief because of some testimony of other employees 
'rho said they did not know of any accident suffered by 
p1•litio11er, and because petitioner had indicated some 
mH ertaint.\' Rs to the exact cause of her pain. 
'l1l1e Arizona Court held the evidence was clear and 
1111controvcrted that petitioner suffered an accident aris-
iu;,· ont of and iu the course of her employment, as this 
cn;.irt shon ld rule here. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner Yvas injured in the course of her employ-
ment and the record is barren of evidence to the contrary .. 
The matter should be sent back for evaluation of 
sums due petitioner for expenses, fees, compensation aud 
percentage of disability. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL 
506 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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